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Gerben Meynen’s article provides, from a legal perspective, a useful starting point to
distinguish between the different types of technologies which offer the possibility of
‘brain-based mind reading’. It is timely because, as he points out, the first profession
that is likely to use these technologies, when they become more accurate, are forensic
psychiatrists. As forensic psychiatric assessments are widely used in the criminal court
roomby judges and in adversarial justice systemsbyprosecutionanddefense, thenwhat
he has to say is of interest to the law. Moreover, there is no doubt that the use of these
technologies raises questions that need to be addressed by lawyers.
Meynen’s article examines someof the incentives that exist to use such technologies,
quoting a forensic psychiatrist, Don Grubin, who argues that the use of traditional lie
detection technology, type I technologies could greatly assist forensic investigations.
Indeed,Grubinmakes the claim that in respect of the polygraph testing of sex offenders
the question for a forensic psychiatrist should not be should it be used, but rather why
it should not be used.1 Such suggestions, especially when they provide for quicker and
cheaper investigatory process, could be very attractive to governments that are looking
for a less costly and more effective way to conduct criminal investigations and shorten
the trial process.
Practitioners of law are likely to be interested in these technologies for at least three
reasons. Firstly, much research has been done into howmemory is laid down, and this
reveals that subjective reports of memories of events are fallible. Furthermore, judge-
ments made by lawyers and lay people of the veracity of evidence given in court are
1 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/compulsary-lie-detector-tests-for-serious-sex-offenders accessed on
Aug. 18, 2017, demonstrates that the UK government, supported by Grubin, set up a training program for pro-
bation officers. The aim was to train them to use lie detection technologies to monitor known sex offenders
released from prison.
C© The Author 2017. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Duke University School of Law,
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likely to be flawed.2 This is said to be because most people do not understand the pro-
cesses by which memories are laid down and how memories are altered in the process
of recall.3 Therefore, being able to discern, using objective rather than subjective mea-
sures, whether someone is telling the truth could be very useful to the courts. Addition-
ally, were fMRI scans or other brain-based techniques to become able, in the future, to
discern andprecisely identify knowledge andpropositional attitudes in themanner sug-
gested in the article for type II and III brain-basedmind reading, it could open awindow
into theminds of people accused of crime.This knowledge of what the accused knew of
salient facts relevant to the criminal event and of the dispositions of an accused would
provide meaningful, and potentially very valuable, objective evidence from which the
case for or against an accused could be constructed.
This raises a number of ethical concerns to lawyers. Firstly, there is a concern that
relates to the clarity of roles in the process of hearing a case.These concerns are relevant
both at trial and in regulating the access to and the use of information leading to prose-
cution by prosecuting authorities.These concerns relate to the historic ideal that justice
must be seen to be done. The reason that trials are public is tied to the idea of the rule
of law. In England, trial by a jury is part of the bundle of rights won from despotic rulers
that aim to protect individuals from arbitrary arrest and unmerited detention and pun-
ishment by the state.4 Thus, there is understandable concern that evidence could be
tendered in court which would usurp the role of the jury. Daniel Schacter and Eliza-
beth Loftus consider this point when reviewing the use of neuroscientific evidence to
determine whether a defendant’s or a witness’s memory is false. They suggest that it is
possible to avoid the jury being ‘led’ by brain-based evidence. Schacter and Loftus ar-
gue that, to avoid misleading juries, brain-based evidence could be adduced in court
together with an explanation of the nature of the evidence and how it should be inter-
preted.5 Explaining why the evidence is relevant routinely happens with other types
of forensic evidence such as fingerprint or DNA evidence. However, there are under-
standable reservations about the use of types I(2), II, and III brain-based evidence in
the courtroom. Perhaps the most pertinent issue to be drawn to the jury’s or judge’s
attention would, in these circumstances be the reverse inference problem. Expressed
as ‘the misguided and incorrect attempt to conclude from observation of activity in an
area that a particular mental process was taking place’.6
Meynen suggests that in some types of brain-basedmind reading information is be-
ing obtained directly from the brain without the individual being able to meaningfully
consent to the process.This is because the individual is not directly responding to ques-
tions but rather to the use of a technique ofmeasuring responses. For example, the con-
cealed information test that aims to use encephalography tomeasure an individual’s re-
actions to facts relevant to the commission of a crime.The brain reaction to the objects
that are salient cannot be inhibited, provided that the individual cooperates with the
test. Drawing inferences from brain-based evidence about an individual’s knowledge
2 Maria Hartwig & Charles F. Bond Jr,Why do lie-catchers fail? A Lens Model Meta-Analysis of Human Lie Judg-
ments, 137 PSYCHOL. BULL. 643 (2011).
3 BRITISH PSYCHOLOGY SOCIETY, GUIDELINES ONMEMORY AND THE LAW, 2008
4 For a fuller discussion of this, see JOHNM.BEATTIE, CRIMEANDTHECOURTS INENGLAND: 1660–1800 (1986).
5 Memory and Law:What Can Cognitive Neuroscience Contribute? 16 NAT. NEUROSCI. 119, 223 (2013).
6 THE ROYAL SOCIETY, NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW (2011).
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or propensity to behave in a certain manner is deeply problematic. This would be the
case even if there were no reverse inference problem.Not the least because some of the
evidence that has been through a process of scientific evaluation is likely to be subject
to errors of interpretation. Additionally, it may contain some false positives within its
results.These problems are all themore difficult to dealwith because errors in expert ev-
idence are unlikely to be detectable to the lay person, legal practitioner, or judge. Judges
and juries are used to evaluating human behavior based on their experience. They are
not normally scientifically qualified in amanner thatwill assist in evaluating brain-based
evidence.
The second reason that such evidencemight be useful to the criminal justice system
is that a deeper understanding of when and whether a convicted offender is safe to re-
lease into the community, would be extremely helpful at the sentencing stage of a trial.
Such diagnoses could be very helpful if theywere able tomore accurately identify those
whoposed a real risk to society.This point is strongly related to the third reason that the
lawmay find such evidence attractive.This is that should neuroimaging become highly
accurate at identifying medical conditions affecting criminal behavior, then this would
greatly assist those accused to tender relevant pleas, and those prosecuting to select the
most appropriate charge. Additionally, objective evidence of medical conditions rele-
vant to a defense would be useful to a court. It should also permit those accused and
convicted of a crime to be offered and gain access to treatment that might make them
less of a risk to the general public.
This argument is a counterweight to the argumentmade above regarding expert evi-
dence usurping the role of the jury.Here the evidence has a practical value and could be
instrumental in aiding a judge tomakemore informed disposal decisions.This suggests
that a distinction may be made between diagnostic expert evidence in court leading to
an authoritative diagnosis of a legally relevant medical condition and more general ex-
pert comments about the disposition, predispositions, concealed knowledge, and other
mental states of an accused that are not strictly relevant to amedical diagnosis.The dis-
tinction beingmade here is between intrusions into privatemental states, in an attempt
to trawl for information relevant to a criminal case, and amedical investigation into the
neurological symptoms of those with recognized medical conditions.
Before examining the concerns about privacy, it would be a good idea to briefly
explore the research evaluation surrounding the use of brain reading evidence in
the courtroom. This may help to understand whether such evidence would have a
detrimental effect on the decision-making capacities of the courts. It is worth not-
ing that in criminal cases the law is only interested in establishing the truth of facts
that are relevant to the crime charged, or to the defense argued. The feature of this
type of analysis of veracity is that, unless there is objective corroborating evidence,
it is a subjective judgement. That subjective judgement is dependent on the assess-
ments made by lay people and/or a judge of the strength or weakness of the case
against the accused. It would be useful to know how much this subjective judge-
ment might be affected by the use of information gained from the technologies dis-
cussed byMeynen. Frances Shen et al. investigated this issue in relation to type I brain-
based reading techniques. The investigation included a review of the research data
relevant to the use of neuroimaging in court and of empirical evidence of the use of
encephalography-based evidence. The finding of the research was that ‘neuroscience
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evidence does affect outcomes, but that it has a weaker effect than the strength of
the case’.7
Why is it that there are concerns about privacy? Sarah Richmond points out that
we are inclined to see the mind as private and that since the Stoics the mind has been
viewed as a ‘haven for private contemplation’. She comments that the idea that neu-
rotechnologies may improve to the point where it can intrude on this private space
‘has great power to disturb’.8 Privacy is often ill defined as is acknowledged by Roger
Brownsword. He suggests interests in ‘opacity’, keeping information to oneself, are
confused with interests to have transparency: ‘an agent’s interest in knowing when,
and for what purpose, information is being collected’. Discussing opacity interests,
Brownsword suggests that this interest relates to the control we have over ‘access to
information about ourselves’. In this sense, the concerns about a forensic investigator
trawling through our minds for evidence of relevance to a criminal event becomes a
concern. This concern engages directly with the arguments about the rule of law, and
what constitutes a fair trial process.Theability to identify informationwhichmaynot be
precisely germane to the criminal offense is covered by type I(2), II, and III techniques
as described inMeynen’s article. Arguably traditional lie detection is less opaque to the
individual questioned, in that the questions are direct and the participant knows how
the information obtained is likely to be utilized.
Brownsword explores the notion of privacy rights in relation to the interception of
private information.His conceptual analysis is useful here as it suggests theremay be an
‘inner sanctum’ of interests that could be identified as in need of protection. But he is
not confident that such a conceptual interest is capable of definition and regulatory pro-
tection. He cautions against tying such analysis to specific brain regions.9 In providing
categories of typology that are not linked to specific brain regions, Meynen’s analysis
potentially makes the evaluation of which of the two categories of interests that are af-
fected by proposed brain reading a little easier.This is because the proposed typology of
brain-basedmind reading specifies what the purpose of themeasure is, how it is carried
out, and what information the technique is seeking to obtain. This will assist at least in
terms of transparency interests.
The concerns surrounding consenting to brain-based investigation techniques, ex-
pressed by Meynen, are relevant to the law and are identified by Brownsword as an
interest to achieve transparency in the purpose and future use of the forensic assess-
ments.Therefore, the future uses to which the information obtained may be put ought
to be made clear to those taking part in brain-based mind reading tests. Obtaining the
real consent of any person accused of crime to the process of forensic diagnosis and
keeping the integrity of the valued professional ways of working is clearly a central con-
cern to Meynen. However, it may be in the accused’s interests to cooperate with the
investigation, particularly if it is clear from other corroborating evidence that they have
committed the crime with which they are charged.
7 Francis X. Shen et al.,The Limited Effect of Electroencephalography Memory Recognition Evidence on Assessments
of Defendant Credibility (2017) doi:10.1093/jlb/lsx005.
8 Sarah D. Richmond, Introduction in I KNOW WHAT YOUR THINKING: BRAIN IMAGING AND MENTAL PRIVACY
(Sarah Richmond , Gerraint Rees & Sarah Edwards, eds, 2012).
9 See footnote 6.
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Brownsword underlines the danger to transparency in interpreting the investigation
as routine.This is a concern that is difficult to address in an era of significant data reten-
tion when the ability exists to store and analyse data in ways that have not previously
been possible. A forensic psychiatric examination may seem to the parties involved to
be routine. What might ‘real consent’ look like in this forensic investigatory environ-
ment? The results of investigatory brain scans or of electoencephalography (EEG)-
based tests may be retained on forensic or medical databases for years. Is it possible
to give or to seek informed consent to the collection and storage of data that may be
accessed years later to obtain information about criminal conduct?
It is difficult to seek informed consent from an individual to the retrieval and stor-
age of a visual record of information about their brain when the record of a brain scan
or EEG may be subject to future scientific interpretation. This interpretation could be
based on scientific research that was not possible to compass at the time of the original
forensic investigation? How can the forensic psychiatrist explain this risk to a client?
It is possible that the law could seek to regulate the use of such information andmake
the use of the information specifically limited to the time, place, and circumstances in
which that informationwas collected.The practical problemwith this is that protecting
suchdatawill bedifficult. Itmaybeheld indifferent countries andbe accessible bymany
agencies. Such information may not even be used in criminal proceedings but may be-
come available to employers and to insurance companies. If this happens, then thismay
seriously affect the economic and social prospects of the person who cooperated with
the investigatory process.
Meynen’s use of a tripartite classification to distinguish the forensic means of brain-
basedmind reading to assess an individual’s liability for criminal acts is to bewelcomed.
It is a meaningful addition to the discussion that needs to continue about the use and
relevance of these technologies to assist in providing evidence fromwhich to determine
the guilt or innocence of an accused person.
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